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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the long history of the development of the inter-
American system, there has, perhaps, been no more important
or controversial a question in the relations between states
than that concerning the principle of nonintervention.
Directed primarily against the "Colossus of the North"
(though often disregarded in inter-Latin American relations),
the principle was consistently advocated by Latin American
diplomats during the period of U.S. interventionist policy
in the Caribbean and Central America during the latter nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. For the sake of
brevity, suffice to say that at the Seventh International
Conference of American States at Montevideo in December,
1933, following the advent of the Good Neighbor policy
earlier that year, the principle of nonintervention was
finally, and formally, established as the cornerstone of the
inter-American system.
In 1965, that principle received its most serious
challenge in over thirty years, for what began as a cuarte-
lazo in the Dominican Republic on April 24 had, within three
short weeks, developed into a major international issue.
What made this so, first and foremost, was the unilateral
intervention of the United States and the reasons given by
.,a
IB
2the Johnson Administration in explanation thereof* Not only
was the underpinning of the inter-American system visibly
weakened by the United States action, but there was also an
indication to many that there had been a basic change in
L.5. policy toward its Latin American neighbors. Some, for
example | viewed the landing of American forces in Santo
Domingo as the exercise of a new interventionist doctrine
toward Latin America; while others, thinking in terras of
U.S. global commitments, evaluated the action as an indica-
tion of intent to prevent, by military force if necessary,
the establishment of communist regimes anywhere in the world.
It came as no surprise, therefore, to find that diplo-
matic activity—and not Just that confined to the Western
Hemisphere alone—could hardly keep pace with the events un-
folding in the Dominican crisis. Dy the middle of May,
moreover, there were present in the Dominican Republic, at
one and the same time, representatives of the three major
protagonists in the struggle: the United States, the
Organization of American States, and the United Nations.
Although the desire to restore peace in that island republic
formed a common goal for their separate activities, other
issues were at stake and the participants acted accordingly.
The major issue facing the Johnson Administration in
the early days of the Dominican revolution was the possi-
bility of the establi- t of another Castro-communist type
•
3of government in the Caribbean. The magnitude and duration
of the U.S. intervention belied the original justification
of intervening on humanitarian grounds, and Administration
officials soon sought to multilaterialize the U.S. action by
seeking the sanction of the Organization of American States.
The discomfiture felt in Washington, however, was no
less acute than that experienced within the O.A.S. Having
been asked for neither its advice nor its consent, the
regional organization suddenly found itself on the horns of
a dilemma. First, the principle of nonintervention, long
regarded as the controlling dynamic of the inter-American
system, was being placed in jeopardy; second, the continuing
effectiveness of regional organizations within the framework
of the United Nations was under serious attack. Under the
circumstances, one was hardly surprised by the initial em-
barrassment and resentment shown by Latin American diplomats.
The issue was no less acute within the United Nations,
although it tended to be overshadowed somewhat by the acri-
monious debate between the two superpowers. In terms remi-
niscent of past US-USSR confrontations, the Soviet Union
sought to gain as much political capital as possible out of
the U.S. intervention, while the United States attempted to
justify its actions before world opinion and called for a
regional settlement of * he dispute. The majority of member
nations of the U.N., meanwhile, appeared less concerned with
.-
.
4the US-USSR conflict than with the decreasing prestige and
effectiveness of the world organization in maintaining
international peace and security.
Little Uruguay, with its long tradition of stable
constitutional government, quickly emergec as one of the
foremost critics of the U.S. intervention. Using both the
O.A.S. and the U.N. Security Council as their forums,
Uruguayan diplomats called for the immediate withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Dominican soil. Consistent with the strict
Latin American Juridical tradition, they repeatedly stressed
the importance of observing the principles of the regional
and universal organizations in the conduct of international
relations. In particular, they voiced their concern over
the so-called "Johnson Doctrine" which, in the Uruguayan
interpretation, endangered the principle of nonintervention
and the right of national self-determination.
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the
Uruguayan position in the O.A.S. and the United Nations
Security Council, placing major emphasis upon the juridical
framework in which Uruguayan foreign policy is formulated.
At the same time, an analysis will be made of the extent to
which Uruguayan foreign policy reflects both its domestic
policy and its concern for the movement for social change in
Latin America. Finally, this author attempts to assess the





5the policies, both domestic and foreign, which that country
has pursued during the twentieth century.
This author knows of no other research done on
Uruguayan foreign policy per se. Past studies of Uruguay
have dwelt mainly upon the advanced social and political
institutions which have characterized that country since the
beginning of the present century. It is hoped, therefore,
that this thesis will further enlarge upon our knowledge of
that small and strongly-democratic Latin American nation.
Concerning the bibliography, it should be noted that
works in the English language relating to Uruguay, although
generally excellent in nature, are rather few in number.
They have, nevertheless, provided a solid foundation upon
which to base the introductory chapters of this thesis.
Chapters II and III, which describe modern Uruguay and the
considerations influencing its foreign policy, rely mainly
upon these secondary sources , especially the studies of
Simon G. Hanson, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, George Fendle, and
Philip B. Taylor, Jr. Chapter IV, describing the Dominican
coup and the U.S. intervention, as well as Chapters V and
VI, which examine the Uruguayan position in the O.A.S. and
the U.N. relative to these events, are necessarily based
upon the various primary sources listed in the bibliography,
particularly the official documents and records of the O.A.S.
,
. United Nations, and the U.S. Department of State, as
-;
i
6well as Uruguayan and U.S. news media. Regarding the lat-
ter, the interpretations of events occurring during the
Dominican revolution were often at variance and, therefore,
used with some caution in this thesis. The translation of
the verbatim minutes of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation
listed in the bibliography is by the author.
.
CHAPTER II
URUGUAY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The juridical orientation of Uruguayan foreign policy
reflects very closely the Juridical approach which Uru-
guayans have adopted for many years now toward their own
domestic politics. Concerning the latter, it should be
noted that no country in Latin America has had a longer tra-
dition of stable constitutional government than has Uruguay,
This reputation, more than any other, has distinguished that
small nation from the majority of her sister republics in
the twentieth century. The domestic policy responsible for
this stability was initiated in the first decade of this
century and has been firmly institutionalized within the
Uruguayan environment. Political compromise, advanced so-
cial legislation, and government intervention in the economy
have been the three major components of that policy.
I. POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
At the turn of the present century, Uruguay had
reached that point in her national existence in which the
decisions made in the next decade or two would be of vital
importance in determining the direction of her future devel-




insurrection would continue to dominate the domestic scene,
as it had since the time of Independence, or a new depar-
ture could be taken which would improve the social and
political environment of the country and pave the way for
political stability and economic progress.
Before an examination is made of the course actually
taken, however, a brief review of the Uruguayan environment
in 1900 will be helpful. Lacking In Uruguay were many of the
sources of internal division found in much of Latin America,
Geographically, Uruguay was a small nation in which communi-
cation and transportation were unimpeded by natural barriers,
such as existed in many other Latin American countries.
Intense regionalism, therefore, was not a factor in Uru-
guayan history. Ethnically integrated, Uruguay contained no
significant number of Indians or Negroes, and its population
was almost entirely of European racial stock. Concerning
religion, the Constitution of 1830 had recognized the
Catholic Church as the religion of the State, yet the Church
had never attained that position of political and economic
"Of the twenty-five governments that guided the Uru-
guayan ship of state from 1830 to 1903, nine were forced out
of power, two were liquidated by assassination and one by
grave injury, ten resisted successfully one or more revolu-
tions, and three were free of serious disturbance during
their periods in office." Simon G. Hanson, Utopia in
Uruguay . Chapters in the Sconomic History of Uruguay (New
York : Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 3.
,.
.
9power which it had in other areas of Latin America. In
addition, attempts to settle Uruguay were begun quite late
in the colonial period, and the imprint of the Spanish
colonial tradition was consequently very weak.
Economically, cattle and sheep raising provided the
most important source of revenue for the small republic in
the nineteenth century, and the stock-raising economy was
one which lent itself to large-scale ownership of the land
in a predominantly pastoral society. The introduction of
the frigorIfico , or meat-packing plant, in 1904, however,
gave impetus to the rise of an urban labor class, whose
ranks were augmented by wage-earners in the small industries
and public utilities. A small urban middle class also began
to appear at this time, consisting of the professional
classes, government workers, and intellectuals. Urban labor
and the middle class were centered primarily in Montevideo—
the capital of Uruguay and its major port.
Concerning domestic politics, Uruguay had a tradition
of political parties dating back to the 1830 •s. Throughout
most of the nineteenth century, however, the Blancos and
Colorados—the two major parties—were characterized more by
their support of rival caudillos than by sharp differences
in party ideology; the result, more often than not, was
2In the modern period, the Colorados have been
mm
10
authoritarian government under caudillo presidents. In the
latter decades of the century, Colorado strength began to
gravitate toward the cities, while the Blancos found their
support among the estancieros in the rural areas. At the
same time, the immigration of tens of thousands of Europeans
3
"who had no part in the inherited political quarrels"
thinned the ranks of native-born Uruguayans and had a notice-
able influence on the trend toward political stability.
It was during these latter decades of the nineteenth
century that Uruguay made a unique contribution to Latin
American political practice through its introduction of the
"pact of the parties," or political compromise, in which the
two rival parties settled certain of their political dif-
ferences. This modus vivendi achieved periods of peace in
closely identified with the urban middle and lower classes
and have endorsed liberal social and economic policies. The
Blancos, who have been more conservative on economic and
social issues, have traditionally represented the rural land-
owning interests. Both parties, however, contain liberal
and conservative factions, making precise definition of
party ideology rather difficult. For a fuller description
of Uruguay*s political parties, see Philip B. Taylor, Jr.,
Government and Politics of Uruguay (New Orleans: Tula:
University Press, 1960), pp. 43-68.
Russell H. Pitzgibbon, Uruguay , Portrait of a
Democracy (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1954), p. 26.
4Taylor, o£. cit . , pp. 17-21. Johnson also speaks of
"the spirit of compromise that has pervaded Uruguayan
politics" during this century. John J. Johnson, Political
Change in Latin America . The Emergence of the Middle Sectors






domestic politics and ensured the survival of the opposition
Blanco party at a time when the Colorados were gaining a
clear dominance in the central government in Montevideo.
These, then, were the dominant aspects of the Uru-
guayan environment in 1903, the year which marks the begin-
ning of the modern period of Uruguayan politics. In March
of that year, there was elected to the presidency Jose
Batlle y OrdoHez, an extraordinary politician who reorgan-
ized the political, social, and economic order of Uruguay so
thoroughly that civilian government, under the constitution,
has characterized the Uruguayan scene ever since.
The program adopted by Batlle during his first term
of office (1903-1907) was one aimed at the establishment of
honest government and political stability. "'I am convinced, 1
he said, 'that the remedy for all our ills lies in electoral
7freedom, in honest elections.*" The Blancos, however,
under the leadership of Aparicio Saravia, rose against the
government in 1903-1904, fearing Colorado encroachment on
their control of certain territorial departments won earlier
5Taylor, o£. cit
• , p. 17.
A brief departure from this tradition occurred in
1933 during the Great Depression, infra
, p. 16.
El Tiempo [Montevideo], January 23, 1903, cited by
Hanson, op. cltTT p. 19.
.
12
as the price of peace. The civil war which resulted was
the last in Uruguay's history and ended in the unification
of the country* Bat lie used his victory over the Blancos
"as a means for final establishment of central governmental
control over the entire national territory rather than as
the basis for a further territorial partitioning of the
9
country between the two parties • "
In addition to his decisive victory over the Blancos
in 3904, Batlle sought to reorganise the Colorado party and
to free it from "the taint resulting from the support it had
given to odious dictators in the past." Under his leader-
ship the power of the conservative, oligarchical, and cor-
rupt forces within the party was weakened, and the urban
lower and middle classes were permitted , even encouraged , to
enter the political process. This was done not only for
idealistic reasons but for sound political reasons as well,
since an enlarged popular base of support of the Colorado
party would ensure its continued electoral success*
Batlle stepped down from office in 1907 "without
a
A pact in 1697 recognized Blanco control over six of
the nineteen departments into which the country is divided*
Kilton I* Vanger, Jose Batlle y Ordonez of Uruguay (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts! Harvard University Press, 1963),
p* 13*
gTaylor, op * cit






having formulated or offered a well-articulated progressive
12program," yet he had done much toward ending the chaos
which had plagued Uruguay during the preceding three-
quarters of a century* He had, moreover, observed that
clause of the still valid Constitution of 1830 which pro-
hibited a president from succeeding himself in office.
13After four years of travel abroad, " Batlle returned
to Uruguay in 1911 and was elected by the Congress to a
second four-year term in office. Within two months, "he
launched the most progressive administration in Uruguayan
14history." In addition to widespread social reform, he
advocated popular rather than legislative election of the
national president, together with proportional representa-
tion in the Congress.
Batlle 1 s greatest battle, however, centered around
15his proposal for a nine-member collegiate executive. He
felt, with much justification, that the basic problems of
Uruguayan governments in the past had stemmed primarily from
12Hanson, o£. cit
• , p. 20.
13
Batlle visited several countries in Western ..urope
between 1907 and 1911, studying their forms of government.
14Hanson, 0£. cit., p. 20.
15Taylor discusses the pros and cons of the argument
that Batlle* s collegiate executive plan was inspired by his
observation of the Swiss executive. Taylor, 0£. cit., p.
167, fn. 74.
ii ) . : .
'
14
dictatorship and political instability. Strong presidents,
handpicking their own successors, had substituted electoral
frauds for honest elections and had contributed to the per-
ennial cycle of revolution, dictatorship, and political
repression so common in Latin America. An executive coun-
cil, he argued, would prevent the gravitation of power into
the hands of a single strong leader and would enlist the
voters faith in the use of the ballot.
Opposition to Batlle's program was strongest among
the Blancos and the conservative minority of the Colorado
party, while the majority wing of the Colorados, under
Batlle's control, backed the proposed reforms. His second
term ended, however, before he could gather enough support
for such radical innovations.
The Colorado party, still under Batlle's leadership
and enjoying a wide base of popular support built up during
his two terms in office, continued to dominate the Uruguayan
political scene after their leader stepped down from the
Presidency in 1915. In the following year, a constitutional
convention was elected to consider the issue of the colle-
giate executive and other constitutional changes. Though
supporting several of Batlle's proposals, an important
fraction of the party opposed him on the question of execu-
tive reform and, hence, the Batllistas were unable to con-
trol the convention. Their threat to push through the

15
Congress in 1918 his election to a third term in the Presi-
dency eventually brought forth a compromise solution, how-
ever, and the result was that the country acquired both a
16president and a council.
As provided by the constitution adopted in 1918, the
President was to be elected for a four-year term by a simple
popular plurality (no longer by the Congress) and would have
within his power the appointment of the ministers of foreign
relations, war and navy, and interior* Sharing the execu-
tive power was an independent National Council of Adminis-
tration—a popularly-elected body of nine members chosen
from the two major parties—which would have control over
the ministries of labor, public welfare, finance, industry,
public instruction, and public works*
Also written into the Constitution of 1918 were pro-
portional representation, the secret ballot, the complete
separation of Church and State, greater autonomy for munici-
palities and territorial departments, and tentative steps
toward suffrage for women* As a result of these constitu-
tional reforms, elections became more orderly, the attafipt
to perpetuate regimes through electoral frauds ceased,
16
For a scholarly treatment of the development of
Uruguay* s executive branch of government, see Philip B.
Taylor , Jr
•
, The Executive Power in Uruguay ( Berkeley
,
California: University of California Press, 1951).
.
16
guarantees of free speech and free press were respected, and
faith in democratic institutions was achieved.
So effective was 3atlle's reorganization and popu-
larization of the Colorado party that it retained its posi-
tion as the majority party after his death in 1929, The
Blancos, long since reduced to the role of the "loyal oppo-
sition , " were nevertheless assured of representation in the
National Council of Administration, as well as in the
General Assembly and in provincial administration. Politi-
cal compromise and constitutional reform had once again
removed a potential cause for revolution.
In 1933, due in large part to the world economic
crisis, Uruguay witnessed its only coup d' etat in this cen-
17
tury. President Terra, feeling that the 1918 Constitution
denied him sufficient power to legislate emergency economic
measures, declared himself dictator and dissolved the
National Council of Administration and the General Assembly.
There resulted a mild dictatorship aimed at the restoration
of economic stability; personal freedoms, however, were not
severely limited. Although economic recovery was accom-
plished between 1933 and 1938, the Terra regime represented
17
For details of the 1933 coup d' etat , see Philip B.
Taylor, Jr., "The Uruguayan Coup d'etat of 1933," The




a marked departure from the tradition of constitutional
government begun by Batlle. According to Taylor, "the coup
of 1933 is not often discussed openly in Uruguay; it tends
to be sotto voce, for Uruguayans do not enjoy discussing
18
something of which they are ashamed." In 1942, constitu-
tional democratic government returned to Uruguay with the
adoption of a new constituticn and the holding of national
elections.
In 1951, there occurred yet another constitutional
19
reform affecting the executive branch of government. The
Blancos, though traditionally opposed to the collegiate
plan, had long since despaired of capturing the Presidency
through elections and began to view a council of government
as the only means by which they could share in the control
of the executive power. Therefore, they supported a Colorado
proposal in 1951 that the collegiate executive be re-
established, this time in its pure form. As subsequently
approved by national plebiscite, a new constitution was
adopted in 1951 which abolished the Presidency and estab-
lished a National Council of Government (NCG) consisting of
18Ibid., p. 319.
19Pendle considers constitutional reform as "the
principle issue in Uruguayan politics." George Pendle,




nine members, six of whom came from the party receiving the
largest number of votes and three from the next most-voted
party. The presidency of the NCG rotated annually among the
majority party members. Mainly protocolary in nature, the
President's powers did not differ substantially from those
of the other members of the Council. Batlle's dream of a
collegiate executive had at last been realized in the form
which he had originally intended.
The Colorado party suffered its first defeat in
national elections in more than ninety years when, in 1958,
the Blancos—or Nationalists, as they are now called—won
20
the election by a margin of 120,000 votes. In 1962, they
managed to retain their majority in the NCG by a thin margin
of 24,000 votes out of more than 1,000,000 votes cast. The
election scheduled for 1966 will undoubtedly prove to be an
equally-close contest.
II. THE SOCIAL LABORATORY OF THE AMERICAS
A widespread movement for social change, noticeable
in virtually every part of the world, has become one of the
dominant features in man»s milieu in the twentieth century.
Whether it be in Latin America or in Africa, in Asia or in
20Voting statistics of national elections held be-
tween 1925 and 1958 are tabulated in Taylor, Government and





the United States, its general characteristics have been
much the same: the attempt by a significant part of society
to abolish, or at least to ameliorate, the social inequities
of the past; their movement for assimilation within the body
politics; and their search for a more equitable distribution
of the fruits of man » s labor
•
In Latin America, as elsewhere, this movement has
brought about basic changes in the structure of society as
well as in the political process of the nation. Further-
more, it has come about either violently, as for example in
Mexico, or peacefully, as in Uruguay, In fact, these two
countries provide a striking contrast when viewing the move-
ment for social change in Latin America in the twentieth
century. Mexico, which inherited a strong colonial tradi-
tion, accented the disparity between the privileged classes
of society and the laboring masses and provided ah environ-
ment in which change was brought about only after a decade
or more of civil strife. Uruguay, possessing little of the
colonial tradition and favored with a homogeneous population,
was able to achieve social reform without disrupting the
constitutional process.
The social revolution led by Batlle in the first
quarter of the twentieth century preceded by several years
the more widely-publicized Mexican revolution. Unlike the
idealist Francisco Madero, who sought only political reform,
II
20
Batlle was a practical politician and realized that lasting
political stability could only be achieved by assimilating
within the body politic "the forgotten man" of society—the
urban worker. Hence, his program of social reform proceeded
apace with that of constitutional reform. Under these con-
ditions, the seeds of violent political and social revolu-
tion were never permitted to germinate.
Combining the influence of his newspaper, j£l Dia
,
with his domination of national politics, Batlle pushed
through the Congress during the first three decades of this
century a body of enlightened labor and social legislation
which has earned for Uruguay the reputation of being the
"social laboratory of the Americas." As early as 1905, a
bill legalizing divorce was enacted over the opposition of
the conservative classes and the clergy. Later that same
year, relief from income taxes was granted to the lowest-
paid public officials and those receiving small pensions.
In 1914, compensation for industrial accidents was enacted
into law.
Batlle' s fight for the eight-hour day, begun in 1907,
was pressed relentlessly until its enactment in November,
1915, together with his proposal for a forty-eight-hour
week. Limited to urban male wage earners, the bill received
little support from rural workers, while the wealthy land-






legislation. Industry in Montevideo, especially the foreign-
owned sector, was also against the proposed bill, Batlle's
victory over such formidable opposition accented both his
personal leadership and the pro-labor orientation of his
party. Concerning further social reform, he wrote, in £1
Dla on October 24, 1915:
You have not seen anything yet, for we are going to
have not only an eight-hour day but also old-age and
retirement pensions, a day of rest in every six, and
many other social laws; seremos una pobre ^ oscura
republlquita pero tendremos leyecitas adelantaditas ,21
In 1919, legislation providing for old-age pensions was
adopted, followed in 1923 by the passage of a minimum wage
law,
Batlle's advanced social philosophy and reform pro-
gram continued after his death in 1929, In 1933, the
Uruguayan government promulgated the first in a series of
laws concerning vacations with pay, while in 1939 a begin-
ning was made in legislating workers' unemployment compensa-
tion. Four years later, a bill was passed which provided
special allowances to lower-income employees, in addition to
their regular salaries, to help them support dependent
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate. In the follow-
ing year, compensation upon dismissal was enacted into law.
Regarding education, Uruguay boasts one of the lowest
21Hanson, 0£. cit • , p. 125
.;
22
illiteracy rates in Latin America. As a result of the work
begun in the 1870' s by Jos4 Pedro Varela, whom Fitzgibbon
describes as "second only to Jos£ Batlle y Ordonez,*' and,
as a result of the educational reforms adopted during the
present century, elementary education is now free and com-
pulsory in Uruguay, In addition, secondary and technical
schools, as well as the University of Montevideo, are also
available to all, free of cost, although incidental expenses,
such as room and board, must be borne by the student and are
thereby limiting factors on enrollment,
III. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY
Parallel to the political and social reforms achieved
in Uruguay during this century were the economic measures
which produced in Uruguay a modified state socialism.
In 1911, at the beginning of his second term in
office, Batlle argued that:
The sphere of state intervention is expanding in
every civilized country. ... The modern state un-
hesitatingly accepts its status as an economic
organization. It will enter industry when competi-
tion is not practicable, when control by private
interests vests in them authority inconsistent with
the welfare of the State, when a fiscal monopoly may
serve as a great source of income to meet urgent tax
problems , when the continued export of national wealth





23Diario de Sesiones de la JH. Camara de Representantes ,
-
23
Convinced that state ownership was In the public in-
terest, Batlle urged the Legislature to create government
monopolies in the basic sector of the economy. In 1911,
therefore, nationalization of the Banco de la Republics was
effected, followed at the end of the year by the establish-
ment of a State insurance bank, initially limited to fire,
life, and workmen's compensation but extended by law in
1926 to cover all risks* In 1912, the ownership and opera-
tion of electric services and the production of industrial
chemicals were made State monopolies* Postal, telegraph,
and telephone facilities became public corporations in 1915,
and during the First World tfar, the State commenced its plan
to purchase the British-owned and operated railway system*
By 1949, Uruguay owned virtually all of the railway system
serving the country.
In 1923, the Uruguayan government entered the meat-
packing business by creating the Frlgorlflco Naclonal—one
of the four frigorlflcos in the country today, the other
three being owned by American and British interests. In
1931, the production of petroleum, alcohol, and portland
cement became a State monopoly, and in 1932, the port
authority in Montevideo came under government control, A
CCXII (1911), p. 79, cited by Hanson, ^jl* cit. , pp. 24-25,

24
State-owned airline was created in 1944 to serve the in-
terior, replacing the former privately-owned airline.
The creation of State monopolies resulted "less from
24
any strong belief in fundamental social theories" than
from the argument that "efficiency of the foreigner merely
increased the amount of dividends sent abroad without aiding
domestic industry, while the State, when guilty of over-
staffing or of paying excessively high wages, added to
25domestic purchasing power."
extended government intervention in the economy has
produced rather favorable results throughout most of the
present century. Ownership by the State has generally pro-
vided satisfactory service in the public utilities; a
privately-owned domestic industry has been allowed to grow
under the protection provided by the State against foreign
competition; the benefits of jobs in the government bureauc-
racy and in the public corporations are comparable to those
found in private industry; and urban labor occupies a
favored position in the national economy as compared to many
areas of Latin America.
While government participation in industry has pro-
duced many of the foregoing desired results, it has also
24Johnson, op_. cit . , p. 56.





created certain disadvantages, the most noticeable being the
very large number of persons employed in the bureaucracy and
public corporations who are directly dependent upon govern-
ment salaries. Speaking of "overpadded personnel rolls,"
Fitzgibbon states that
• • • three-fourths or more of the budget is normally
allocated for payment of personnel and 20 per cent or
more of the whole Uruguayan population (including
family members) depend for their livelihood on wages,
salaries, or other income from the government .26
To sustain its economy, Uruguay depends primarily
upon the maintenance of a favorable balance of trade in
which wool, wheat, beef, and hides are the chief exports.
Both productivity and exports, however, have declined in
recent years, resulting in an unfavorable balance of trade.
This, in turn, has led to a serious decrease in gold re-
serves, spiraling inflation, an increased cost of living,
and strikes for higher wages,
IV. THE URUGUAYAN WELFARE STATE: AN OVERVIEW
Because of the relation between domestic and foreign
policy, it would be well at this point to summarize the
political, social, and economic aspects of the Uruguayan
26
Fredrick B, Pike (ed.), Freedom and Reform in
Latin America (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of NoTre




environment mentioned previously in order to arrive at a
meaningful overview of that nation's present domestic situa-
tion.
Politically, the measures adopted in Uruguay since
1903 have made "the government more democratically respon-
sive and a significant fraction of the people more politi-
cally conscious and articulate than in any other country of
27Latin America." Uruguayan governments, under predomi-
nantly middle class leadership, have functioned in a society
in which the traditional power of the Church and the mili-
tary are of only minor significance. Urban labor, which has
been wooed for over half a century by progressive social and
labor legislation, forms a solid base of support for the
predominant Colorado party. Compromise has frequently been
used as a political tactic, thereby obviating potential
causes for revolution by a dissident minority. In addition,
faith in the ballot, the resort to constitutional reform
rather than revolution, and respect for individual rights
and liberties have made of Uruguay a strong constitutional
democracy.
Socially, the measures adopted in Uruguay in the past
sixty years have made of that small country the first wel-
fare state in the Americas. A long list of social and labor






legislation, guaranteed under the Constitution, has prompted
Fitzgibbon to say that "the bodily and the social ills of
Uruguayans are responsibilities weighing more heavily on the
public conscience than can be said of any other Latin Ameri-
28
can country." Because of this, the Communist party has
found meager opportunity to Influence Uruguayan society,
Uruguay *s social legislation and general lack of poverty
have not provided fertile ground for the traditional commu-
nist appeal, although the party has been accorded almost
complete freedom in its activities.
Economically—and here we approach the crucial issue
facing Uruguay today
—
government intervention has served to
provide a satisfactory business atmosphere until the past
decade. Prior to the 1950' s, a favorable balance of trade
was normally maintained, domestic industry was promoted,
public corporations provided satisfactory services in the
basic sector of the economy, and the peso was sound. Since
mid-1950, however, due to the increasing cost of the welfare
state and the decline in productivity and exports, Uruguay
has increasingly encountered an unfavorable balance of trade
and serious inflation. In 1963, for the first time, Uru-
guay's gold reserves became practically nonexistent; produc-
tion, which decreased 10 per cent in 1962, dropped even







lower in 1963; the average work week was only twenty-five
hours; the only productive increase was in the cattle indus-
try; and imports exceeded exports by over fifteen million
29dollars. Uruguayans, used to the good life provided by
the welfare state, have as yet failed to adopt the austerity
measures required to reverse these trends. The country 1 s
first comprehensive government-sponsored economic survey,
completed at the end of 1963, reported that the gross
national product had been declining since 1955, and that
social security and welfare benefits were more expensive
than Uruguay could afford unless something were done to spur
30productivity and exports. Added to this is the fact that
20 per cent of the working force is dependent on government
salaries.
Because of the inevitable correlation between eco-
nomics and politics, the Uruguayan economy must soon be
stabilized if its governmental system is to remain secure.
Measures have already been taken, with additional reforms
certain to follow. The election of 1958, which brought the
opposition Blanco party into power, gave evidence of dis-
satisfaction with the unsound economic climate which
developed in recent years under the leadership of the
29
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Colorados. Although some reforms have already been initi-
ated, a major austerity program has not yet been adopted
because of the difficulty of decision-making in a bifurcated
executive which diffuses authority and responsibility. A
national plebiscite scheduled for 1966 to consider the re-
establishment of the office of President and the dissolution
of the National Council of Government could result in a step
which would enhance the passage of effective economic legis-
lation. This, in turn, would do much toward improving the
domestic stability so necessary for effective foreign policy
formulation.

iCONTEMPORARY URUGUAYAN FOREIGN POLICY
A review of contemporary Uruguayan foreign policy pro-
vides the 3tudent of international relations with a striking
and generally refreshing contrast to that of the majority of
Latin American republics, tfhereas boundary disputes, revo-
lutions, and interventions have been rather commonplace in
Hispanic-America, they have been almost completely absent in
Uruguay* s relations with its neighbors and the international
community. Pendle has observed:
It is evident that the Uruguayans have transported
into the sphere of international deliberations the
convictions which, since the year 1903, have de-
termined the social and economic development of their
own country.
*
I. RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
Uruguay* s foreign policy and freedom of action on the
international scene have been influenced considerably by its
position between Argentina and brazil. Granted independence
in 1S28, through British mediation, as a small buffer state
between the two giants of oouth America, Uruguay suffered
the intervention of one or the other of its two powerful
•orge Pendle, Uruguay (second edition; London:
Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 79.
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neighbors at various times throughout much of the nineteenth
century* By 1903, however, Uruguay no longer had reason to
fear for its sovereignty, and Its territorial boundaries
were well established*
Uruguayan relations with Argentina and Brazil in the
contemporary era have been affected primarily by the follow-
ing considerations: geographic proximity; Argentine and
Brazilian ambitions in the past toward Uruguay; differences
in size, population, and resources; and long-standing
antipathy between the peoples of Uruguay and Argentina which
would make politically unpopular any undue deference to
Argentina on the part of an Uruguayan government* Because
of these factors, Uruguay has sought "to use some other
large nation as a counterweight to Argentina*" Brazil has
traditionally filled that role, although, particularly since
the 1940* s, the United States and membership in the 0«A«S«
and the U*N* have offered additional means of guaranteeing
Uruguayan sovereignty*
One of the most important areas of conflict in
Uruguayan-Argentine relations has been the granting of
asylum to Argentine political refugees* This was particu-
larly a source of friction during the regime of President
9
a* Taylor, Jr*, The Executive Power in Uruguay




Per6n (1946-1955). Per6n launched a campaign to try to pre-
vent Argentine political exiles from being allowed to attack
his government on the Uruguayan radio and in the press.
Since Uruguay refused to limit the freedom of speech of
exiled anti-Per6nistas, Argentina retaliated by imposing
travel restrictions which virtually cut off all tourist
traffic between the two countries, thereby removing one of
Uruguay's chief sources of revenue. The Rodriguez Larreta
doctrine of 1945 , regarding collective inter-American inter-
vention in the internal affairs of nations with dictatorial
4
regimes, was directed primarily against Argentina and coin-
cided with the beginning of an anti-Fer6n movement in United
States foreign policy. Although the U.S. quickly endorsed
the Uruguayan foreign minister's proposal, it was rejected
by the majority of Latin American republics who were unwill-
ing to modify significantly the principle of nonintervention
<
After Peron's downfall in 1955, travel restrictions were
immediately lifted, thereby restoring to Uruguay a needed
source of revenue.
3Uruguay's gross receipts from tourism fell from the
equivalent of about $22 million in 1948 to $6 million in
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. , pp. 94-95.
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Since 1955, Uruguayan-Argentine relations have been
quite amicable, and negotiations between the two countries
have mainly concerned commerce in the Plata River area. A
new Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was negotiated in
1956, followed in 1957 by an agreement to set up an
Argentine-Uruguayan Commission to resolve national bounda-
ries along the Uruguay River. In 1960, Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay joined Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Mexico in
negotiating the Treaty of Montevideo, which established the
7Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA).
Relations with Brazil in the twentieth century have
been particularly amicable. The Colorados, who governed
Uruguay continuously from 1865 to 1958, have always inclined
toward Brazil. Relations between the two countries were
strained briefly in 1935 when Getulio Vargas charged Monte-
video communists with fomenting revolutionary activities in
Brazil. Uruguay, in turn, broke off diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union, charging use of the Soviet legation
Secretaria del Senado, Republica Oriental del
Uruguay, Tratados v^ Convenios Internaclonales (Montevideo:
1960), Vol. II, p. 5T5T:
7 ,
For a concise treatment of LAFTA, see Albert 0.
Hirschman (ed.), Latin American Issues (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, Inc., 1961), pp. 128-133.
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in the capital as a communist propaganda center for much of
8
southern South America.
Treaties and conventions negotiated in the last two
decades have primarily concerned the promotion of transpor-
tation and trade. A new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
9
was signed in 1949, and in 1960 the creation of LAFTA obli-
gated the two countries to even closer economic cooperation.
II. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES,
I JRN EUROIrE, AND THE SOVIET UNION
Uruguay *s relations with the United States in the
twentieth century have been, on the whole, very friendly.
Sympathy for U.S. policy in both world wars led to the revo-
cation of Uruguay 1 s neutrality decrees vis-eVvis the Allies.
In World War II, this led to the acceptance of U.S. financial
and technical assistance in establishing naval and air bases
for the defense of the Americas against Nazi submarine war-
fare.
During the postwar period, Uruguay 1 s policy toward
the United States has generally been sympathetic in respect
a
Taylor, op_. cit
. , p. 92; Russell H. Fitzgibbon,
Uruguay : Portrait of a Democracy (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University lres"s, 1954), p. 255.
9Secretaria del Senado, Republics Oriental del
Uruguay, op . cit . t Vol. I, p. 479.
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to Cold War issues. For example, the United States has been
able to count on Uruguay's vote in the U.N. General Assembly
on major issues affecting the interests of the United States.
Specifically, Uruguay voted in favor of the Uniting for
Peace Resolution in 1950, voted against admission of Commu-
nist China to the U.N. , and supported the U.S. position in
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. In matters of a strictly
regional nature, however, Uruguay has steered a more diverg-
ing course as, for instance, in 1964, when it opposed the
application of economic sanctions against Cuba and the
breaking of diplomatic relations. Though being on record
against the sanctions imposed by the Ninth Meeting of Con-
sultation, it has, nevertheless, complied with them.
Treaties with the United States date back to 1852
when the first Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
was concluded between the two countries. In 1905, a Treaty
of Extradition of Criminals was signed. Economic relations
with the United States are of major importance, however, and
the U.S. has been the principal supplier of Uruguay 's im-
ports and a leading market for its exports in recent years.
Uruguay, moreover, does not rely upon U.S. government loans
OAS, Novena Reuni6n de Consulta de Ministros de
Relaciones Exteriores para Servir de 6rg'ano de Consulta en
Apllcaci6n del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca






and grants as do a number of Latin American nations. During
the period 1946-1958, it received 0.6 per cent of the total
U.S. loans and grants to Latin America. Uruguay's politi-
cal stability and economic progress in the first half of
this century enabled it to rely mainly upon normal commer-
cial channels for economic development rather than upon
direct U.S. aid.
Uruguay's relations with Western Europe in recent
decades have been mainly economic in nature. Great Britain
has traditionally been a chief market for Uruguayan beef,
wool, and hides, while West Germany has emerged since WW II
as the second most important European market for its prod-
ucts. In 1960, Great Britain and West Germany together ab-
sorbed 33 per cent of Uruguay's exports while providing 15
12per cent of its imports. Trade with the nations of
Western Europe will continue to receive prime attention in
an effort to promote greater economic development.
Concerning the U.S.S.R., Uruguay was the first Latin
American nation to renew diplomatic relations with that
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on For-
eign Relations, United States-Latin American Relations
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 477,
12
Banco Coraercial [Montevideo], "Informaci6n econ6-
mica del Uruguay: El coraercio exterior en el an*o 1960,"
cited by Pan American Union, Uruguay , American Republics










country after WW I, exchanging representatives in 1926.
Relations were severed in 1935, however, because of subver-
sive activities of Russian legation officials in Montevideo.
Relations were resumed in 1943 during the course of wartime
cooperation.
Uruguay's trade with the Soviet bloc in recent years
has accounted for 1 per cent of its exports and 5 per cent
of its imports. Up to 1960, Latin American trade with the
Soviet Union was concentrated mainly in Argentina, Brazil,
Cuba, Chile, and Uruguay, and accounted for a very small
13percentage of total world trade.
The Communist Party of Uruguay is given a free hand,
in seeping with the strong spirit of democratic freedom for
which the country is famous. Uruguayan socialism and a
relatively high standard of living, however, have not pro-
vided a proper atmosphere for real communist success, and
membership in the Communist Party is estimated at less than
1 per cent. 14
III. PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL
AND UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATIONS
Uruguayan interest in regional organizations was
13United States Congress, o£. cit . , p. 639.







voiced very succinctly in 1920 when President Baltasar Brum,
in an address at the University of Montevideo, spoke of an
"American league of nations." Being years ahead of his
time, Brum proposed a league which would work in harmony
with the League at Geneva and would have authority and
responsibility over peculiarly-American problems, including
defense of the American states. His proposals thus preceded
by a quarter of a century the Rio Treaty of 1947, the
Charter of the Organization of American States in 1948, and
15the relationship between the OAS and the United Nations.
In the development of the inter-American system,
Uruguay has played the role which might be expected of a
small and militarily weak, yet democratic, state. Its for-
eign policy has always stressed the sovereignty and juridi-
cal equality of states, the peaceful arbitration of disputes,
American solidarity and collective security, and the
importance of observing international law. In the twentieth
century, it has promoted democratic principles of government
within its own country, has engaged in neither wars nor
expansionism, has never been accused of breaking the prin-
ciple of nonintervention, and has generally been on good
terms with the nations of this hemisphere.
Typical of Uruguay's policy in the O.A.S. was the
15Fitzgibbon, op_. cit





position taken by its delegation at the Ninth Meeting of
Consultation in 1964 to consider Venezuela's charges against
Cuba, The Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Alejandro Zorrilla de
San Martin, stated that, in the opinion of his country,
there had not taken place an "armed attack" by Cuba within
the meaning of the Rio Treaty. In addition, he stated that
the economic sanctions proposed by the O.A.S. would hurt the
Cuban people, rather than their government, and would pro-
mote national action to consolidate, rather than weaken, the
Cuban regime. Nevertheless, Uruguay bowed to majority
opinion and complied with the sanctions imposed under the
> Treaty. In doing so, it had expressed its legal objec-
tions and moral reservations but did not shirk its obliga-
tion as a member nation of the regional body.
Uruguay's representatives have also taken an active
part in the United Nations. In general, they have spoken
with great moral authority on human rights and peaceful
17
methods. Believing firmly in the right of national self-
determination, Uruguay was the prime mover in the Latin
American bloc for the decisive support given to the
16
OAS, 0£. clt . , pp. 5-7.
17For a study of Uruguayan policy in the U.N. , see
Uruguayan Institute of International Law, Uruguay and the






establishment of the state of Israel. During discussions
on the former Italian colony of Eritrea, the Uruguayan dele-
gation again strongly backed that same principle. In 1946,
expressing its strong aversion to dictators, Uruguay opposed
the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Spain on
the grounds that Franco's government was totalitarian in
nature and had been established with the help of the Axis
powers.
In 1950, the Uruguayan delegation proposed that
definition of international aggression should be widened to
include indirect aggression "such as the creation by any
Power of subversive agencies in foreign countries with the
20
object of undermining those countries 1 institutions." In
the same year, Uruguay supported the Uniting for Peace Reso-
lution which strengthened the authority of the General
Assembly in matters dealing with international security.
IV. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN
POLICY FORMULATION
Problems currently affecting the formulation of for-
eign policy in Uruguay are mainly domestic in nature. The
i ft
The New York Times , March 3, 1960.





nine member National Council of Government has shown signs
of political stagnation which, in turn, have prevented ef-
fective policy-making and implementation. In 1962, for
example, concerning the position to be taken at the inter-
American conference on Cuba, the Council split three ways
when the six members of the Nationalist Party majority
divided evenly on whether to adopt a "hard line" or a "soft
line" toward the Castro regime, and the three members of the
Colorado Party minority abstained in view of the majority
split. Foreign Minister Homero Martinez Montero submitted
his resignation because of this; but after the Council re-
fused to accept it, he went to the conference without in-
structions and under orders to refer any majority decision
21to the Council.
Considering the fact that the Nationalist Party won
the election later that year by a margin of only 24,000
votes out of more than 1,000,000 votes cast, it is reason-
able to expect that the leadership in the executive counc
will continue to find decision-making difficult because it
22lacks a popular mandate and has no majority in the Congress.
Political stagnation has, in turn, led to economic stagna-
tion due to the inability to formulate effective programs to
2 1The New York Times , January 20, 1962.
22





combat Inflation, to regain a favorable balance of trade,
and to promote productivity.
Domestic policy, therefore, rather than foreign
policy, is the major concern of the present Uruguayan admin-
istration. How effectively it deals with current political
and economic problems will determine, to a large degree, the
vigor and effectiveness of the foreign policy which it
strives to pursue on the international scene.
-
CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN APRIL, 1965
On April 24, 1965, the civilian junta , headed by
Donald Reid Cabral , was ousted by elements of the armed
forces of the Dominican Republic, In view of the chaos that
ensued and in order to protect American lives, President
Johnson issued orders for the landing of American marines in
Santo Domingo to facilitate the evacuation of U.S. nationals.
This initial purpose of the U.S. intervention was soon ex-
panded to include a certain political objective—the preven-
tion of the establishment of another communist government in
the Western Hemisphere.
I. THE DOMINICAN COUP D'ETAT
The coup d' etat which occurred in Santo Domingo on
April 24, 1965 placed in bold relief the serious problt
which had plagued the small Caribbean republic since the
assassination of strongman Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina
in May, 1961. Trujillo 's thirty-one-year dictatorship left
in its wake a people untutored in constitutional government,
an economy weakened by corruption, and a social structure in
which the military and the wealthy predominated.
'tarn
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In December, 1962, following eighteen months of rule
by a seven-man civilian Council of State, Juan Bosch was
elected president in the first free election in over thirty
years. By mid-1963, however, military commanders and con-
servative business forces became restless under the liberal-
minded Bosch, claiming, among other things, that he was
"soft on communism," When the military, under the leader-
ship of Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin, demanded that he pass
a law outlawing the Communist Party, Bosch reacted by call-
ing for Wessin y Wessin 1 s resignation. The latter ste a
bloodless coup in September that exiled Bosch to nearby
Puerto Rico.
For the next eighteen months, the nation was ruled by
a three-man civilian junta supported by the military. In
December, 1963, Donald Reid Cabral, an auto dealer in Santo
Domingo, moved up from his position as foreign minister to
president of the junta . U.S. military and economic aid,
which had been suspended after Bosch's ouster, was restored
when Reid launched an austerity program and attempted to
wipe out military graft and corruption.
Reid was more businessman than politician, however,
Bosch, leader of the PRD ( Partido Revolucionario
Dominicano ) , was inaugurated on February 2TJ 1963, having
received 60 per cent of the votes in an OAS-supervised






and he gradually alienated his bases of support. While try-
ing to stabilize the nation's lagging economy, his policies
antagonized business groups and labor leaders alike and
2
resulted in heavy unemployment. On the political scene, he
announced that neither Juan Bosch nor Joaquin Balaguer
would be allowed to run as candidates in elections to be
held in September, 1965; at the same time, however, he
hinted that he himself might campaign for the Presidency,
Bosch and Balaguer supporters were visibly antagonized.
Finally, Reid lost his primary base of support—the
military. In an effort to end corruption, he initiated a
reform program which was intended to stop smuggling and
other questionable commercial activities in which some
senior military officers were engaged. In addition, he re-
moved a number of senior military officers from key posi-
4tions and tried to bring the armed forces under civil rule.
Junior officers, meanwhile, felt that the military reforms
were not broad enough and were being executed too slowly.
2At the time of the coup , it was estimated that one-
third of the nation's labor force was unemployed. Visi6n t
May 14, 1965, p. 12.
3Balaguer, as the last president under Trujillo,
headed a Council of State which ruled the nation during the
transition period following Trujillo 's assassination. In
January, 1962, he was exiled to New York, where he organized
the Partido Reforrrti3ta
, ibid . , June 12, 1964, p. 19.




Out of this precaxious economic and political situa-
tion arose the revolution which began on Saturday, April 24,
1965. Although reports of the exact sequence of events in
the first few hours of the revolution were somewhat at vari-
ance, it seems clear to state that the movement started as a
coup by young officers who wished to return Bosch to the
Presidency, but that by the following morning various politi-
cal groupings in Santo Domingo had joined the rebellion to
pursue their individual objectives. On April 25, Reid
resigned and went into hiding, having failed to retain the
support of the Dominican military commanders.
What began as a military coup quickly assumed the
proportions of a popular uprising. Those in favor of re-
turning Bosch to the Presidency included civilian members of
the PRD, supported by young officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Dominican army. Anti-Bosch forces consisted
of most of the senior military officers, as well as those
units of the armed forces which they were able to control.
Radio stations in Santo Domingo were used by opposing fac-
tions to rally the support of the civilian population.
On Sunday afternoon, Rafael Molina Ure*fta, a leading
U.S. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett left Santo
Domingo on April 23 for consultations in Washington. Also
absent on the day of the coup were eleven of the thirteen
officers of the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Mis-
sion, who were attending a conference in Panama, The




figure in the PRD, was installed by the rebel movement as
provisional president pending Bosch's return from Puerto
Rico, F aring that they might have to face the bulk of the
nation's military, the rebels distributed arms to the
civilians in Ciudad Nueva, the rebel-controlled sector of
Santo Domingo,
After the installation of Molina Ure*?ia, Wessin sought
out the support of the navy, while the head of the air force
directed air attacks upon the rebel-held National Palace.
Alleging pro-communist sympathy on the part of Bosch, Wessin
saw in the rebel movement the threat of a communist takeover
and called for support in his fight against communism.
By April 27, the air force, navy, and most of the army
had aligned themselves on the anti-rebel side, and the threat
of an all-out attack upon the rebel area of the capital
seemed imminent. Fearing their position to be hopeless in
the face of such odds, Molina Uretla and some of his advisors
went to the U.S. Embassy to seek Ambassador Bennett's inter-
cession in arranging a settlement. When their attempts
failed, however, Molina UretSa sought asylum in the Colombian
Embassy while other leaders of the PRD fled to various other
Latin American embassies. At this juncture, the rebel move-
ment seemed doomed.





The collapse of rebel leadership was only momentary,
however, and on the following day—April 28—Colonel Fran-
cisco CaamaHo Detio emerged as head of the movement , which
now contained significant numbers of armed civilians. The
superior military position which Wessin earlier enjoyed was
reversed that afternoon when a tank-led attack upon Santo
Domingo was repelled by rebel forces.
By the afternoon of April 28, the situation in Santo
Domingo was one of confusion and anarchy. With politically-
immature rebel military officers outnumbered by armed
civilians, it was alleged that leadership of the movement
7
was passing into the hands of communists. Wessin, mean-
while, had formed a three-man military junta headed by Air
Force Colonel Pedro Bartolom£ Benoit to act as provisional
government. Complete coordination and control of the junta
military forces had not yet been achieved, however, and
Wessin* s efforts to smash the rebel movement during the 28Uj
were unsuccessful.
By late afternoon, the breakdown of law and order
appeared complete. Armed mobs terrorized the city, firing
indiscriminately on homes and other buildings, including the
United States and other embassies. Anti-rebel military and
police authorities informed the American Embassy that they
7
Ibid., May 1, 1965.
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were no longer able to guarantee the safety of American
lives,
II. INTERVENTION ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS
On April 24, after receiving the first news of the
revolt, President John on ordered a U.S. Navy task group to
the vicinity of the Dominican Republic as a "routine pre-
9
cautionary move." On the following day, Americans in the
Santo Domingo area were advised by embassy officials to pre-
pare for evacuation. Those who desired to leave began to
assemble at the Hotel Embajador on the 26tb. The evacuation
commenced on the following day, and by nightfall 1,172
persons of American and other nationalities departed by ship
and helicopter.
Q
"On April 28 . . . the colonel [Benoit] sent another
note to Ambassador Bennett which read: 'Regarding my earlier
request, I wish to add that American lives are in danger and
conditions of public disorder make it impossible to provide
adequate protection. I therefore ask you for temporary
intervention and assistance in restoring order in this coun-
try. ' The New York Times , May 7, 1965.
9Led by the amphibious assault ship Boxer, which
carried a reinforced Marine battalion of 1,500 men, the task
group was in the Caribbean on a training cruise at the time
of its re-assignment. The State Department emphasized that
"there was no intention of using the 1500-raan Marine bat-
talion aboard the Boxer to 'intervene' in the Dominican
political situation," ibid., April 27, 1965.








On April 28, Ambassador Bennett, who had returned to
Santo Domingo on the preceding day, viewed with apprehension
the armed revolt in the capital and feared that the continu-
ing evacuation of Americans was in danger. By late after-
noon, having been advised that protection of American lives
could no longer be assured, Bennett cabled Washington and
urged the immediate landing of U.S. troops. At 6:30 p.m.,
President Johnson's authorization was received by the U.S.S.
Boxer, and the landing of four hundred Marines commenced
immediately.
In a nationwide radio-television broadcast later that
evening, the President said:
The United States Government has been informed by
military authorities in the Dominican Republic that
American lives are in danger. These authorities are
no longer able to guarantee their safety, and they
have reported that the assistance of military person-
nel is now needed for that purpose.
I have ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the
necessary American troops ashore in order to give
protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in
the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back
to this country. This same assistance will be
President Johnson, meeting with Secretary of State
Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, received the cable
at 5:14 p.m. As the President later stated, "Ambassador
Bennett ... went on in that cable to say that only an
immediate landing of American forces could safeguard and
protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of
other citizens of some 30 other countries. Ambassador
Bennett urged your President to order an immediate landing."
U.S. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. LII, No. 1351, May





available to the nationals of other countries, some
of whom have already asked for our help. 12
On the following day, additional forces were landed,
including two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division from
13Fort Bragg. By May 5th, 3,270 persons had been evacuated,
while the number of U.S. troops had risen to 19,000. By
this time, however, humanitarian considerations had assumed
secondary importance to the intervention's political impli-
cations.
III. INTERVENTION ON POLITICAL GROUNDS:
THE SO-CALLED JOHNSON DOCTRINE
From April 28 until May 2, the Johnson Administration
publicly justified the U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic on purely humanitarian grounds. Outside the Admin-
istration, however, a political motivation for the U.S.
action was being mentioned within less than forty-eight
hours after the first Marine landing.
On April 30, the New York Times stated that "through
a combination of hemispheric diplomacy and a military show
of force, the Administration was hoping to bring about a




13This number consisted of 1,897 Americans and 1,373








edition, Tad Szulc reported from Santo Domingo that "a high-
ranking United States Navy officer declared that the func-
tion of the Marines was not only to protect the continuing
evacuation but also 'to see that no Communist government is
established in the Dominican Republic. ,n Szulc went on to
say that the Marines "would support the forces of the
Dominican military junta in their attempts to smash a
Communist-infiltrated revolt. **
An official hint concerning possible communist infil-
tration of the rebel movement was voiced on the evening of
April 30, when President Johnson stated that "there are
signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are
14
seeking to gain control. ' On May 2, in a nationwide
radio-television broadcast, the President spoke in more
specific terms:
The revolutionary movement took a tragic turn.
Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba ...
joined the revolution. They took increasing control.
And what began as a popular democratic revolution,
14U.S. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. LIT, No.
1351, May l7, 1965, p. 747T A day earlier, however, U.S.
Ambassador £lisworth Bunker told the CAS ambassadors that
"the Embassy reported that the leadership of the rebellious
forces had very clearly fallen into hands of extreme left-
wing Castro-communist leaders, with some few army officers
who were cooperating. Responsible supporters of Mr. Bosch
and the leaders of his political party had abandoned the
straggle and signified their desire for a cease-fire. " OAS,
Acta de la sesion del consejo de la PEA celebrada el 19 de








committed to democracy and social justice, very
shortly moved and was taken over and really seized
and placed into the hands of a band of Communist
conspirators
•
The American nations cannot , must not, and will
not permit the establishment of anot .1. -onununist
?
overnment in the Western Hemisphere . ""[Italics not
n the original i. This was the unanimous view of
all the American nations when, in January 1962, they
declared , and I quot *The principles of communism
are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-
American system. "15
The italicized portion of the above Presidential
16
statement was quickly labeled the "Johnson Doctrine" and
dispelled any doubts that may have still existed concerning
the purpose of the U.S. intervention. In addition to the
original humanitarian justification for the U.S. action, its
political motivation was now defined in unmistakable terms,
and subsequent American military and diplomatic moves were
directed toward that end. On Kay 9, the total number of
U.S. forces either on the island or aboard ship off Santo
IS
U.S. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. LII, No.
1351, Kay"T7, 1$5§, pp. iZ%-lW.
16Addressing the U.N. Security Council on May 4,
Ambassador Carlos Maria Velasquez of Uruguay apparently was
the first to use the term !1Johnson Doctrine," arguing that
it was a unilateral political statement rather than a legal
doctrine, infra
, pp. 76-77. The term made its first appear-*
ance in The New' York Times on May 5 in separate articles
authored oy James Reston and C. L. Sulzberger. On May 6, an
editorial in The New York Times stated that "the Johnson
Doctrine means that the emphasis is now going to be on
resisting the advance of communism anywhere in the world
with military force . . . ."
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17Domingo had increased to 30,522, At the San Isidro air
base, meanwhile, activity mounted daily as 296 U.S. aircraft,
operating from bases in 11 states, ferried in troops and
18
supplies. The magnitude of the U.S. commitment gave clear
evidence of its purpose, for such a large number of troops
apparently went beyond that required to effect an evacua-
tion. Also, the deployment of the U.S. forces in Santo
Domingo indicated to some observers Washington's alignment
with the military junta in the latter' s efforts to crush the
rebel movement.
During this time, further attempts were made by vari-
ous Administration officials to explain the U.S. interven-
tion. When it was charged that the U.S. had acted without
20
either consulting or advising the OAS, President Johnson
said
:
There may be those in our own country who say that
such action was good but we should have waited, or we
should have delayed, or we should have consulted fur-
ther, or we should have called a meeting. But from
the very beginning, the United States, at my instruc-
tions, had worked for a cease-fire beginning the
Saturday the revolution took place. The matter was
17
The New York Times , May 9, 1965.
18Ibid. , May 7, 1965.
19Ibid. , May 2, 1965. See also Tad Szulc, "When the
Marines Stormed Ashore in Santo Domingo," The Saturday
Evening Post , July 31, 1965, pp. 36-46.
20
The New York Times, May 2, 1965.
.
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before the OAS Peace Committee on Tuesday, at our
suggestion. It was before the full Council on
Wednesday, and when I made my announcement to the
American people that evening, I announced then I was
notifying the Council ... there was no time to
talk, to consult, or to delay • • . •
Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save
the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of
all people. Our goal, in keeping with the great
principles of the inter-American system, is to help
prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere
... .21
During a press interview several days later, Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk explained:
The first action taken by the United States was
indeed a rescue operation ... after the initial
emergency, United States forces were necessary to
preserve the situation in the Dominican Republic
until the OAS could take charge. Meanwhile the evi-
dence was mounting that the Communists had captured
the revolution according to plan, and the danger of
a Communist takeover was established beyond ques-
tion. 22
At a special meeting of the OAS Council on April 29,
Ambassador Bunker stated:
The United States must ... reserve its right to
take the necessary measures to protect its own citi-
zens and officials from violence in a situation of
anarchy.
There are many precedents for this kind of situa-
tion. None of this is inconsistent with the
21U.S. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. LII, No.
1351, May l7, 1965, pp. 745~-747.
22
**Ibid., Vol. LII, No. 1353, May 31, 1965, p. 842.






inter-American obligations. We wholeheartedly sub-
scribe to these obligations, including the doctrine
of nonintervention and self-determination.
We are not talking about intruding in the domestic
affairs of other countries; we are talking simply
about the elementary duty to save lives • . • .23
On May 5, U.S. Representative Adlai Stevenson said
in the United Nations Security Council:
The United States action in the Dominican Republic
was emergency action taken to protect lives [italics
in the original] and to give the inter-American
system a chance to deal with a situation within its
competence.
In this case—when hours and even minutes counted—
there was no time for deliberate consultation and for
the organization of international machinery which did
not yet exist. 24
Addressing a University of Toronto convocation later that
month, Stevenson added that "until the international com-
munity is ready to rescue its victims, there is no alterna-
25
tive but national power to fill the peace-keeping vacuum."
Depending upon the analyst's point of view, the im-
plications drawn from these statements were varied. For
realists versed in the tradition of power politics and
23 ,
^A3 » Acta de la sesion del consejo de la QSA celeb-
rada eJL _29 de Abrll de 1965 , op. clt . , Part Y3f, p. 34,""
24
U.S. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. LII, No.
1353, May~3T, l£S5, p. §777





spheres of influence, the United States had apparently acted
out of both domestic and foreign policy considerations in
trying to prevent the debacle of "another Cuba." For
legalists whose primary frame of reference is the conduct of
international relations in accordance with existing contrac-
tual obligations, the U.S. action was deemed a violation of
the charters of the OAS and the UN. Many, however, while
recognizing the realistic as well as the legalistic implica-
tions of the U.S. intervention, were more concerned over the
possible effect which it might have upon determining the
direction of the movement for social change in progress
throughout Latin America. They voiced the fear that U.S.
policy toward the Dominican revolution might raise a ques-
tion about the sincerity of the United States expressed con-
cern for social reform and might frustrate the hopes of the
democratic Left, thereby causing them to accept support from






THE URUGUAYAN POSITION IN THE O.A.S.
The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic
raised fundamental issues for the inter-American system, not
only relative to the outcome of the iominican crisis itself
but also in respect to the continuing effectiveness of the
regional system. Opposition to the policy adopted by the
United States in the Dominican crisis was strongest among
Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador, and i^eru. Uruguay, in par-
ticular, voiced strong disagreement with both the U.
intervention and the course which the O.A.S. followed during
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs. Consistent with its juridical approach to the con-
duct of international relations, Uruguayan diplomats re-
peatedly stressed the contractual obligations imposed upon
member states by the O.A.S. Charter and urged that proposed
measures strictly conform to the juridical principles con-
tained in the Charter and the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance.
I. OPPOSITION TO THE CONVOCATION OF THE
TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION
At a secret session of the OAS Council on the morning
of April 29, which was convened at the request of the United
--
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states, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker reported on the
action taken by his government on the preceding evening and
told of the developments in the Dominican Republic which led
to that action. Citing the breakdown of law and order in
Santo Domingo, he explained the necessity of sending in U.S.
forces in order to insure the safe evacuation of U.S. and
other foreign nationals. Also, he mentioned the involvement
of Castro-communist leaders in the rebel movement.
Bunker's statement was followed by that of the
Dominican Ambassador, Jose Antonio Bonilla Atiles, which
described the situation in Santo Domingo as a struggle
against communism rather than a contest between political
parties. Comparing the Dominican rebellion to the Castro
revolution in Cuba, he warned that "the problem is not a
2Dominican problem; the problem concerns all of us . • • .
"
After the approval of a Colombian resolution which
requested that the Council direct an urgent appeal for a
cease-fire, the delegate from Venezuela informed the assem-
bled ambassadors that his government intended to introduce a
resolution calling for a meeting of the Organ of Consultation
OAS, Acta de la sesion del consel o de la organizacion
rfe l°f Estado's Americanos celebrada el 2§ de AbTil de
^Washington, 1965), GEA/Ser G/II, Document C-a-569, Part I





under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty to consider the grave
situation in the Dominican Republic, In the lengthy discus-
sion which followed, some of the delegations favored adopt-
ing the Venezuelan proposal, while others suggested the
desirability of convoking a Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 39
of the OAS Charter.
After recessing to enable delegates to contact their
governments, the meeting of the Council was resumed that
evening in open session. Two resolutions were introduced at
that time—one by Venezuela calling for a meeting of the
Organ of Consultation; the other by Chile requesting a Meet-
ing of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. One by
one, the various delegates expressed their governments'
views.
3Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Treaty) , Article 6: "If the inviolability or the integrity
of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence
of any American State should be affected by an aggression
which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or
intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situa-
tion that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of
Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the
measures h must be taken in case of aggression to assist
the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
which should be taken for the common defense and for the
maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."
4OAS Charter , Article 39: "The Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in order
to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common
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In accordance with instructions received from the
Uruguayan National Council of Government, Ambassador Cmilio
N. Oribe stated that he would vote against the proposal to
convoke a Meeting of Consultation, since his government con-
sidered that the object of such a meeting would be a matter
"exclusively under the internal jurisdiction of the Domini-
can Republic. " According to the information possessed by
the Uruguayan executive council, the Dominican crisis had
not as yet endangered the peace and security of the American
States. Oribe further emphasized his nation's "displeasure
toward every type of intervention which is not authorized by
existing international agreements" and urged the Council to
conform its actions in strict accordance with international
law and the juridical procedures sanctioned by the inter-
5American system.
After considerable deliberation, a vote was taken
which approved the Chilean resolution, and the opening of
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation was scheduled to commence
on May 1.
OAS, Acta de JLa sesion del Consejo de la Or cranizacion
de los £stados A.merTcanos . Reanudacion de la Sesion Qrdi-
naria Celebrada el 29 de*"AbrIT~de 1965 ( Washington , 1965)
OEA/Ser G/II, Doc. C-a^5~69 (.provisional ] , Part II, April 29,
1965, pp. 19-20.
The vote was 18-1 (Uruguay), with one abstention
(Dominican Republic). Cuba, of course, is presently excluded
from participation in the OAS. For the text of Chile's reso-
lution, see Appendix A.
_.
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Bunker then proposed that the Council reiterate its
appeal for a cease-fire and that it request that an inter-
national neutral zone of refuge be established in Santo
Domingo surrounding the embassies of foreign governments.
Because of humanitarian considerations, there was general
7
approval for this resolution; Uruguay, however, abstained
from giving its approval. Oribe argued that the Council was
exceeding its authority in passing a resolution which, in
his interpretation, was of a political nature and thus not
within the competence of the Council. Had Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty been invoked instead of Article 39 of the Charter,
he reasoned, the Council would have been empowered immedi-
ately to constitute itself as provisional Organ of Consulta-
tion and adopt measures necessary to deal with the Dominican
crisis. Under the circumstances, he concluded, further
action should await the opening session of the Meeting of
gConsultation on the following day.
II. DISAPPROVAL OF THE U.S. INTERVENTION
The opening plenary session of the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation commenced on May 1 under the presidency of the
Nicaraguan Ambassador, Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa. As was
7For text of the resolution, see Appendix B,
8OAS, o£. cit. , Part II, pp. 43-45.
-
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expected, the statements made by many of the Latin American
delegations reflected a strong opposition to the unilateral
U.S. intervention, as well as their reaffirmation of the
juridical principles of the inter-American system. Although
recognizing the gravity of the situation which the OAS was
facing, they were in general agreement on the desirability
of pursuing only such a course which would fall within the
framework of the contractual procedures sanctioned by the
OAS and which would strengthen the image of the regional
system in the eyes of the international community. Although
Mr, Bunker again justified the U.S. action on purely humani-
9tarIan grounds, Latin American criticism focused upon U.S,
violation of the provisions of the Charter prohibiting uni-
lateral intervention. Foremost among the critics were
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru,
Q
OAS, Decima Reunion de Consulta de Ministros de
Relaciones £xteriores (Washington: Pan American Union,
1965), Document 14 (rev,), May 28, 1965, p, 8. [Hereafter
cited as Decima Reunion de Consulta ,
]
OAS Charter , Article 15 : "No State or group of
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State, The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements";
Article 17: "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may
not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation
or of other measures of force taken by another State, di-
rectly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No terri-
torial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by






Ruben A. Chelle, representing Uruguay in the tempo-
rary absence of Ambassador Oribe, followed his government's
instructions to "reject energetically . . • every type of
intervention, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of
an American nation in violation of Articles expressed in the
OAS Charter • . . •" In the view of his government, he
emphasized, the topic of the Meeting of Consultation "should
be interpreted ... as referring principally to the grave
armed situation created by the landing of forces • • • of an
American nation upon the territory of the Dominican Repub-
lic . " Later that day, during discussions concerning the
sending of an investigating committee to Santo Domingo,
Chelle indicated Uruguay's support for the measure, with the
reservation that "the landing of North American troops" be
12included among the aspects to be investigated.
Two days later (May 3), in support of resolutions in-
troduced by Mexico and Chile calling upon the U.S. to end
13its intervention, Oribe urged the immediate withdrawal of
U.S. forces "which," he said, "are in the Dominican Republic




, Doc. 24 (rev.), Kay 27, 1965, p. 17.







contrary to international law and the GAS Chartex Re-
ferring to President Johnson* a speech of the preceding
15
evening, Oribe pointed out that the mission of U.S. forces
in preventing the establishment of another Communist govern-
ment in the Western Hemisphere "goes far beyond the inter-
American agreements for defense against communism existing
at this time. ' He reminded the delegates that the Eighth
Meeting of Jonsultation at Punta del £ste in 1962 estab-
lished that a communist regime was incompatible with the
Charter of the 0A3 and that any nation adopting such form of
government might be temporarily excluded from participation
in the reqional organization. t have not reached the
point," he continued, "of authorizing a collective action,
and much less a unilateral action • • « for preventing the




On May 5, during the Ministers' debate on the crea-
tion of an inter-American peace force, Uruguay's criticism
14Ibid ., Doc. 32 (rev.), May 27, 1965, p. 19.
15Supra
, pp. 52-53.












of the U.S. intervention reached its peak. In a lengthy
statement in defense of existing inter-American agreements,
Oribe analyzed the salient features and implications of the
U.S. action. Noting the continuing buildup of U.S. fore s
in the Dominican Republic and referring once again to Presi-
dent Johnson's speech of May 2, Oribe spoke of "a fundamen-
tal change in U.S.. policy toward the nations of the South .
"
[italics not in the original.] He continued:
The United States has clearly proclaimed that its
leaders, deeply preoccupied by their experiences with
Cuba and the Cold War, now assume as their sovereign
right the unilateral use of armed force anywhere in
the Continent with the declared objective of prevent-
ing ... the establishment of any more communist
regimes in America, be it as a result of foreign
intervention or of direct action by native elements.
Such, in effect, is the nucleus of what has now been
called the Johnson Doctrine. *
After tracing the development, and subsequent repudia-
tion, of the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, Oribe continued:
It is necessary to emphasize that as a program of
unilateral U.S. political action the Johnson Doctrine
... can extend much farther than the old corollaries
of the Monroe Doctrine. Three special features appear
in the very grave and dangerous outline for the future
of Latin American States .... In the first place, the
new doctrine is a doctrine of preventive action. It
concerns preventing the establishment of a specific
type of government in the Americas .... In the second
place, the new doctrine doesn't seem to attempt to
distinguish whether the movements which should be re-
pressed under its aegis respond to native or foreign
aspirations .... In the third place, [it] affects
the nature of the society and of the state and the
very political system of the government of a nation,
1965, p. TT.






instead of concerning itself, as did the old Roose-
velt Corollary, with problems of ports and customs
houses and the repayment of loans and financial
obligations • *°
Refuting the allegation that the U.S. action was
justified because of the slowness of the OAS mechanisms
during times of urgency, as well as the Charter's absolute
prohibition of intervention, the Uruguayan Ambassador out-
lined the steps taken by the OAS during the Cuban missile
crisis in October, 1962, and argued that only twenty-four
hours were required to authorize the naval and air blockade
which followed.
Oribe then expressed his delegation^ surprise that
the U.S. had thought it necessary to resort to a unilateral
use of force prior to consultation with the regional body.
He enumerated the OAS mechanisms which could have been
utilized by the U.S. prior to its intervention, e.g., the
Meeting of Consultation, the Inter-American Peace Committee,




21Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of
the Political Integrity of the American States aqalns€*
"
the
Intervention of International Communism :"" "The Tenth Inter-
American Conference declares that the domination or control
of the political institutions of any American State on the
part of the international communist movement • • • • will
constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political inde-
pendence of the American States which would place in danger
the peace of America and would necessitate a Meeting of Con-









latter mechanism, Oribe added, "was introduced into inter-
American law by the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, for the express purpose of utilizing it, when [such
an] occasion should arrive."
III. SUPPORT, WITH RESERVATIONS, FOR THE OAS
SPECIAL COMMISSION TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
In spite of its opposition to the U.S. intervention
and the convocation of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation,
Uruguay voted in favor of the resolution establishing a
five-man investigative commission to be sent to Santo
23Domingo, but it did so with reservations. The primary
aspect to be investigated by the Commission, according to
the Uruguayan delegation, should have been the landing of
U.S. troops rather than the internal affairs of the Domini-
can Republic. Also, while supporting the functions of the
Commission dealing with mediation and conciliation, Uruguay
insisted that there should have been included in the resolu-
tion the phrase: "To solicit the Government of the United
States to withdraw the armed forces which it has sent to the
24Dominican Republic."
22
Decima Reunion de Consulta , Doc. 40 (rev.), June 2,
1965, p. "21T
23For text of the resolution, see Appendix C.







Established on the evening of May 1, by a vote of 19
to (Chile abstained), the Commission was made up of dele-
gates from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and
Panama, and it departed for Santo Domingo early the follow-
ing morning,
IV. OPPOSITION TO THE CREATION OF
THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE
In taking upon itself the task of preventing a pos-
sible communist takeover in the Dominican Republic, the
Johnson Administration had sent in large numbers of U.S.
forces , had officially advised the OAS after the action had
been taken, and had offered to the Tenth Meeting of Consul-
tation two resolutions transferring responsibility to the
regional organization. The first resolution provided for an
OAS presence on the island through the medium of the Special
Commission; the second was a proposal for the establishment
of an inter-American force (IAF) to be sent to Santo Domingo
to facilitate the work of the Commission. Both resolutions
were introduced on May 1.
While the proposal for an investigative commission
was both debated and adopted on the same day, the resolution
calling for the establishment of a multilateral OAS force
introduced important changes to inter-American agreements





scope of this thesis to dwell at length upon the numerous
considerations surrounding the creation of the IAF, it will
nevertheless be useful to summarize in capsule form the
opposing positions taken by the Latin American nations.
Those countries which opposed the creation of the
inter-American force did so primarily because they wished to
maintain intact the acknowledged cornerstone of the inter-
American system—the principle of nonintervention. The
creation of a multilateral force would, in their opinion,
not only seriously weaken that principle but would also have
grave implications for the principles of sovereignty and
juridical equality. These principles, they argued, had pro-
vided some measure of protection against possible economic
and military leverage on the part of the United States.
They, therefore, felt that the unilateral action of the
United States in the Dominican Republic should not be given
the appearance of legal sanction by substituting for it a
collective OAS action. Adopting this position were Mexico,
Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru.
The nations which favored the creation of the inter-
American force were those which deemed that the principle of
nonintervention should not be a shield behind which other
principles of the inter-American system might be violated,
for example, respect for human rights and the effective




Dominican crisis, they deemed such a force necessary to pre-
vent the situation from deteriorating to the extent that
either a military dictatorship of the Right or a Castro-type
dictatorship of the Left might result. In general, they saw
in the proposal a means of strengthening the inter-American
system and safeguarding the principles contained in the OAS
Charter. 25
After several days of deliberation, the resolution
was voted upon in the early morning hours of May 6 and
approved by a vote of 14-5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and
26
Uruguay), with one abstention (Venezuela).
In explaining Uruguay's negative vote, Oribe reiter-
ated his government's opinion that the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation was considering a matter wholly within the
internal jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic. The ille-
gality of the U.S. intervention, he argued, "should not be
regularized through the creation of a new international
27force." Any type of collective action, he continued,
could only be justified under Article 19 of the OAS Charter,
which permits such action for the maintenance of peace and
25
Decima Reunion de Consulta , Doc. 29 (rev.), May 27,
1965; Doc. 32 (rev.) , May 27, 1965; Doc. 40 (rev.), June 2,
1965.
26
For the text of the resolution, see Appendix D.
27Decima Reunion de Consulta, Doc. 41 (rev.), June 8,






security in accordance with existing treaties. The
Dominican crisis, he reminded the Meeting of Consultation,
had not been formally declared as having placed in danger
the peace and security of the Continent. In summary, Oribe
emphasized Uruguay's strict interpretation of, and unyield-
ing adherence to, the principles contained in Articles 15,
17, and 19 of the Charter.
28QAS Charter , Article 19: "Measures adopted for the
maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing
treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set




THE URUGUAYAN POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
As a non-permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council at the time of the Dominican crisis, Uru-
guay used the occasion to voice her firm adherence to the
juridical obligations established by international law. The
violation of such obligations, Uruguay argued, would result
in anarchy within the community of nations. Based upon this
position, the Uruguayan representative condemned the U.S.
intervention in the Dominican Republic as a violation of
existing international agreements and introduced a resolu-
tion affirming U.N. competence in regional affairs.
I. CRITICISM OF THE U.S. INTERVENTION
On May 3, 1965, the United Nations Security Council
met at the request of the USSR "to consider the question of
the armed interference by the United States in the internal
affairs of the Dominican Republic." From the beginning,
however, it could be seen that the question was being
United Nations, Security Council, Verbatim Minutes
of the One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Sixth Meeting of the
Security Council (New York, 1965), S/PV 1196, May 3, T£6"57~
p. 3. [Hereafter cited as UNSC Minutes. ]
,
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debated in terms reminiscent of past US-Soviet confronta-
tions. Not limiting himself solely to the circumstances
surrounding the Dominican situation, Soviet Ambassador
Nikolai Fedorenko used the occasion to characterize the U.S.
intervention as another example of "United States imperial-
ism. " According to Fedorenko:
This new aggressive act • . • , the military inter-
vention in the Dominican Republic, is being carried
out, as were the acts of the colonialists in the
past, under the tattered and false excuse of the
defense of American lives .2
Referring to the American claim that the intervention of
communism was a factor in the Dominican revolution, the
Soviet representative stated that "once again, the bogey of
3
anti-Communism has been dragged out" and "American leading
circles ever more frequently resort to armed interference in
the affairs of other countries that are struggling for
4
national liberation."
A week later, referring to the role being played by the
OAS, Fedorenko alleged that:
... under pressure from the United States the
Organization of American States has taken an unprece-
dented and illegal set of actions which have resulted
in the creation of the so-called inter-American armed
forces. These actions ... are designed not to put








. , p. 21.





FedorenJco specifically charged the United States with
c
having violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter
and introduced a draft resolution condemning the U.S. action
and demanding the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from
7the Dominican Republic.
Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. representative in the
Security Council, justified his country's action primarily
on humanitarian grounds but referred also to the intrusion
of communist elements in the Dominican revolt. Stevenson
declared that "revolution in any country is a matter for
that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for
hemispheric action only—and I repeat, only—when the object
o
is the establishment of a communistic dictatorship." Quot-
ing from President Johnson's televised address of May 2nd,
Stevenson emphasized that:
The American nations will not permit the estab-
lishment of another communist government in the
Western hemisphere. This was the unanimous view of
all the American nations when in January 1962 they
declared, "The principles of communism are incom-
patible with the principles of the inter-American
system." This is, and this will be, the common
action and the common purpose of the democratic
forces of the hemisphere, as President Johnson has
c
...... :harter , Article 2, paragraph 4: "All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
7UNSC Draft Resolution , 3/6328, May 4, 1965.







said. For the danger is also a common danger and the
principles are common principles. So we have acted to
summon the resources of this entire hemisphere to this
task.
9
On the second day of deliberations on the Dominican
situation, the Uruguayan representative, Carlos Maria
Velazquez, stated his government's views in respect to the
U.S. intervention. After referring to the position taken by
Uruguay in the OAS, Velazquez said:
... The position of my Government, I think,
rests squarely within the strict Latin American
juridical tradition.
The Charter of the Organization of American
States ... was the culmination of a lengthy process,
arduous at times, that was intended to establish cer-
tain basic guarantees without which inter-American
co-existence ran the risk, as history had already
proved, of turning into anarchy or the despotism of
the strongest, and the very crux of that entire
system and network of guarantees was to be vested in
the principle of non-intervention. 10
Criticizing the landing of U.S. troops on Dominican
soil as a violation of Article 15 of the OAS Charter,
Velazquez argued that President Johnson's statement of May
2nd could not be advanced as a legal fiat :
.... This Johnson doctrine cannot be considered
a legal doctrine, for the idea embedded in it is
that, although revolutions may constitute prima facie
domestic problems which the countries themselves have
to solve, they cease to be so and they call for hemi-












communist doctrine. That seems to go further in
scope than all the norms extant in the inter-American
system • • • •
This doctrine, as its old ancestor, the doctrine
of President Monroe ... is not only a political
statement ... but expresses unilateral views,
issued under the exclusive responsibility of the
Government of the United States.
H
In reference to President Johnson's assertion that
the legal basis for such a doctrine rested upon the decision
taken by the OAS at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in
1962, Velazquez pointed out—as did Oribe in the OAS—that
the decision referred to by President Johnson provided for
the exclusion of a communist government from participation
in the organs of the inter-American system but did not go so
far as to authorize preventive action to forestall the es-
12tablishment of communist regimes.
Velazquez concluded his remarks that day by emphasiz-
ing the importance which Uruguay places upon the strict
adherence to existing juridical norms:
... from very early on in its own historic
experience—one that was as painful as that of the
other Latin American nations—my country knew full
well the need that the world be effectively regulated
by respect for the laws of international morality and
the set-up of legality • • • • The fate of the small
nations gradually, if all this is to be lost, is to
become most hazardous. Our position is far from
obeying what some realistic minds might call beati-








realistic attitude toward the law, and this is an
example which we think could be followed. We, the
small nations , feel that the strict applicatTon of
juridical norms— that ""is , to ensure j ur ic ~z
security—constitutes one of the cornerstones of our
own security Litalics not in the original J, Ana7 , if
I may be allowed to say so, the great may stretch the
texts as far as they like, because, when all is said
and done, if it is a question of taking political
decisions based upon the will and not upon reason, it
is they, the great, who can dictate such decisions.
We
, the small nations , need to cleave intransigently
to the norms of la
_
Titalics not in the original J,
We must know,"Tor reasons of our national interest,
just how far we can go, and ultimately—and this is
the most important—-how far we can be dragged. ^3
II. THE URUGUAYAN RESOLUTION OF MAY 11, 1965:
AN ASSERTION OF U.N. COMPETENCE
IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS
In contrast to the active role being played by the
OAS, the Security Council failed to take early action be-
cause of a deadlock which arose over the question of juris-
diction between the regional and universal organizations.
While the Soviet representative stressed the priority of the
U.N. in dealing with matters affecting international peace
and security , the U.S. representative repeatedly referred to
the effectiveness of the regional organization and its
priority of competence in handling the Dominican dispute.





inactivity of the Security Council in the face of the U.S.-
Soviet impasse, and the question of Jurisdictional priority
assumed increasing importance.
In explaining Uruguay *s approach to the relationship
between the OAS and the U.N. Velazquez cited che words
spoken by the head of the Uruguayan delegation at the Ninth
Session of the General Assembly:
My country combines membership in the United Nations
with membership in the Organization of American States
in the belief that the principles of the regional sys-
tem and the safeguards which it offers cannot be in-
voked in order to prevent States from having direct
and immediate access to the jurisdiction of the United
Nations or to deprive them, no matter how temporarily,
of the protection of the agencies of the world com-
munity. The legal protection afforded by both systems
should be combined, never substituted for one
another • • • •
Addressing himself to the Dominican crisis, Velazquez con-
tinued :
... elegation has no doubt whatever regarding
the competence of the Security Council to deal with,
and to continue to deal with, any controversial dis-
pute the extension of which may endanger international
peace and security, even if such a controversy is at
present under examination in a regional body • • . .14
By May 11, it appeared that the deadlock reached in
the Security Council debate might prevent any action what-
ever. With this in mind and in view of the seemingly-
deteriorating situation in Santo Domingo, Uruguay made the
14Ibid., pp. 11-12. See also, Uruguayan Institute of
International Law, Uruguay and the UN (New York: Manhattan






first move to present a draft resolution aimed at prodding
the Council into action. In doing so, Velazquez stated his
country 1 s concern not only for events in the Dominican
Republic but also for the continuing effectiveness of the
U.N. in the maintenance of international peace and security.
Referring to the lack of agreement among the members
of the Council, Velazquez observed:
... in view of the statements that have been made
in the course of this debate, I think we must conclude
that there is no unanimous agreement in the Security
Council regarding the substantive decisions that the
Council might adopt. In the view of my delegation,
this is the most serious of all the facts before us,
because the absence of a decision by the Security
Council would imply, regardless of the doctrinaire
or theoretical statements that might be made, the
Inability of the Council to fulfill its duties ....
the result would be to delay or undermine the effective
application of the legal guarantees against aggression
as set forth in the Charter. But this damage would not
only be done to small nations. The United Nations it-
self would be damaged, and the Security Council would
be damaged. The prestige and authority of the Organi-
zation might be seriously jeopardized at a time in its
history when, for reasons well known to all of us, it
is the duty of every member to do everything in its
power to strenghthen the Organization, and not to weaken
it even further.
Therefore, confronted by this picture, my delega-
tion feels that the only road open to us is to try to
reach agreement on a draft resolution which, without
pronouncing itself at this stage of the debate on the
substance of the question, would nevertheless allow
the Council to exercise its competence litalics not in
the originalT~and, at the same rime, unequivocally to
state its authority. Although this might be the only
course open to the Council at the moment, I believe




debate end without adopting any draft resolution
whatever .15
The resolution introduced by Uruguay, while taking
note of the measures already adopted by the OAS, reaffirmed
Article 24 of the UN Charter which confers upon the Security
Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security." Velazquez argued:
Temporary priority of the regional organization
• • • only refers to the type of international con-
troversy which might be settled peacefully by nego-
tiation, and not situations of the present case,
which are accompanied by charges of aggression, 16
Citing also the articles of the charters of the U.N. and the
OAS which refer to the principle of nonintervention, the
Uruguayan resolution reaffirmed the right of the Dominican
people to exercise, without coercion, their right of self-
determination. In addition, it called upon the OAS to keep
the Security Council informed of its actions in the Domini-
can Republic and to cooperate with the U.N. Secretary-
General in the implementation of the resolution. Most
importantly, however, it "invite Cd] the Secretary-General to
follow closely the events in the Dominican Republic and to
take such measures as he may deem appropriate for the pur-
pose of reporting to the Security Council on all aspects of










17the situation. M The latter provision, while not specifi-
cally stating so, vaguely suggested the presence of the
Secretary-General or his representative in Santo Domingo and
18
was generally interpreted in that light,
Velazquez soon discovered, however, that his resolu-
tion failed to satisfy at least two of the five permanent
members of the Council. The USSR found it lacking because
it failed to condemn explicitly the U.S. intervention, while
the U.S. criticized it because it might "tend to complicate
the activities of the Organization of American States by en-
couraging concurrent and independent considerations and
19
activities by the Council."
Before the Uruguayan resolution could be brought to a
vote, however, events in Santo Domingo precipitated an emer-
gency meeting of the Security Council on May 14. On the
preceding evening, Secretary-General U Thant received a
telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Con-
stitutionalist Government of the Dominican Republic, which
1 7UNSC Draft Resolution , S/6346, May 11, 1965. Por
text of the resolution, see Appendix E.
1 An editorial in El Pais [Montevideo], May 17, 1965,
criticized "the abandonment of regional competence" and
lamented that "in such an unfortunate episode we see Uruguay
in a position contrary to its obligations to regional soli-
darity . . . ."











accused U.S. forces of proceeding beyond the positions
assigned them in the security zone and of supporting the
forces of the military junta in an attack upon the Constitu-
20tionalist forces of Colonel Caamaflo.
At this point, a resolution was hastily drafted by
Jordan, Malaysia, and the Ivory Coast to deal with the imme-
diate situation. Adopted unanimously by the Council, the
resolution "invite [d] the Secretary-General to send, as an
urgent measure, a Representative to the Dominican Republic
for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on the
21present situation."
According to Velazquez, the differences between the
Uruguayan resolution of May 11 and that adopted on May 14
were significant. Whereas the former would have given the
Secretary-General an authorization, in somewhat vague terms,
"to follow closely" the events in the Dominican Republic and
"to take such measures as he may deem appropriate" in order
to report to the Security Council, the latter specifically
authorized him "to send a representative," thus calling for
the direct intervention of the U.N. Latin American opinion,
2 UNSC Minutes , S/PV 1208, May 14, 1965, pp. 2-5.
2 1UNSC Resolution , S/Res/203, May 14, 1965. For text










nevertheless, was generally critical of the Uruguayan posi-
22
tion. c
The result of the Councils action on May 14 was to
inject, for the very first time , the physical presence of
the U.N. into a regional dispute* With this accomplished,
the Council resumed its deliberations, at Fedorenko's insist-
ence, on the Soviet resolution of May 4 demanding the with-
drawal of U.S. forces.
On May 21, the Soviet resolution was finally brought
23
to a vote, but only the USSR voted in favor of it.
Pedorenko then introduced into the pending Uruguayan resolu-
tion an amendment condemning the U.S. Intervention and
calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This amendment,
24
voted upon separately on May 22, was likewise defeated.
Although the Uruguayan resolution had, in effect,
been superseded by the Council's resolution of May 14, it
too was brought to a vote but received the support of only
France, Jordan, Malaysia, and the Ivory Coast, in addition
to Uruguay. The USSR voted against it because of its
22La ttaftana [Montevideo], May 30, 1965, reported the
critical aTtitude noted in much of Latin America toward the
Uruguayan position in the U.N.
2 3UNSC Minutes , 3/PV 1214, Kay 21, 1965, pp. 61-62.
24UNSC Minutes , S/PV 1216, May 22, 1965, pp. 31-35.
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references to the OAS, while the United States and Bolivia
voiced their abstention because it failed to give sufficient
recognition and encouragement to the role being played by
the regional organization. Also abstaining were China, the
25Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
The assertion of U.N. competence in regional affairs
turned out to be the only substantive action taken by the
Security Council during the first month of the Dominican
crisis. Although its representatives in Santo Domingo sent
back daily reports of their activities, it became increas-
ingly clear that the U.S. and the OAS were having consider-
ably more influence upon the shaping of events in the
strife-torn island than was the U.N.
Obviously disappointed with the minimum role assumed
by the United Nations and apprehensive of the course taken
by the OAS Tenth Meeting of Consultation, Velazquez stated
on June 7:
.... It is with particular concern that we con-
sider the possibility that this unfortunate episode
of the Dominican Republic may serve as a pretext for
the adoption of political formulas which, under the
shadow of multilateralism—equally vague and impre-
cise—might in the future be used to justify inter-
vention in any other Latin American country.
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set up to allow the effective exercise of a police
force by the international community, we must once
again reaffirm the old concepts which still apply and
which still provide"""^,-. :- ~) shiel to protect .. kl
"
weak [italics not in the original J • 2TT"
The Uruguayan position in the United Nations Security
Council can best be summarized, therefore, as one of un-
yielding adherence to the legal precepts embodied in inter-
national law. Critical of the U.S. intervention and opposed
to the course adopted by the OAS, the Uruguayan representa-
tive sought to inject the influence of the United Nations
into the Dominican dispute in an attempt to counter-balance
the multilateral action sanctioned by the regional organiza-
tion. This was done, it seems, not so much on the merits of
the Dominican question itself but rather on the principle
that the small nations of the world must be uncompromising
in the conviction that their principal source of protection
lies within the legal guarantees provided by international
law.




Respect for legal norms has served Uruguay well in
her international relations during the twentieth century.
As a small and militarily weak buffer state located between
two powerful neighbors, she early realized the importance of
stressing international law, rather than national power, as
the desirable course to pursue on the international scene.
Consequently, the principle of nonintervention, as well as
considerations of national sovereignty and the juridical
equality of states, have been the main pillars of her for-
eign policy. And just as the Charters of the OAS and the
U.N, provide some measure of guarantee for these principles,
so also does Uruguay aspire to an active role in these
organizations in the effort to strengthen the principles
which- they endorse. The primary factor explaining Uruguay's
position on the Dominican crisis in 1965, therefore, was
this attempt by a small nation to maintain the delicate
balance which exists in the world today between the observ-
ance of international law and the exercise of national power,
A second, and perhaps equally important, factor re-
vealed in the Uruguayan position is the strong and reinforc-
ing legalistic parallelism between her domestic and foreign
policy. Domestically, Uruguay had been suffering from
I
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serious economic problems for the past decade, and at the
time of the Dominican crisis, she was faced with a national
bank scandal and a series of paralyzing strikes. The
National Council of Government, hindered by its diffusion of
authority and responsibility, was unable to cope effectively
with the deteriorating economic situation. This resulted in
the decision to schedule a national plebiscite in 1966 to
consider the abolition of the collegiate executive form of
government and a return to the presidential form of govern-
ment. Whereas such unstable economic and political condi-
tions might have provided the excuse in some countries of
Latin America for a resort to unconstitutional means for
their solution, in Uruguay they merely emphasized the need
of employing legal methods, as had he&n done many times in
the past. The emphasis on legal norms revealed in Uruguay 1 s
foreign policy during the Dominican crisis, therefore,
served to reinforce the domestic legalism which was required
to maintain her tradition of constitutional government
during a period of internal crisis.
The position examined in this thesis, moreover,
closely parallels the overall foreign policy, traditions,
and principles which have guided Uruguay during this century
and which have had as their primary objective the achieve-
ment of social justice within a stable constitutional envi-




social change in Latin America is a logical outgrowth of
this tradition. Therefore, Uruguay feared that any action
taken by an inter-American force to suppress the Dominican
revolution might frustrate the democratic Left in Latin
America and might tend to identify the GAS with the conserva-
tive Right—especially the military. Because of this,
Uruguay opposed the creation of the Inter-American Force and
refused to contribute troops to it. At the same time, she
supported the U.N. presence in the Dominican Republic as a
means of counter-balancing the activities of the OAS.
In conclusion, it should be noted that circumstances
of geography, population, and resources will undoubtedly
prevent Uruguay from ever reaching medium or great power
status. As a substitute for national power, therefore, and
until such time as the world is effectively regulated by
law, it may be concluded that Uruguay will continue to play
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The Ambassador Representative of Chile, on April 29,
1965, addressed a note to the Chairman of the Council in
which his Government requested "that a Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Minis oreign Affairs be convoked for the
first day of May 1965";
As the agenda for the aforesaid meeting, which would
be held pursuant to the terms of Article 39 of the Charter
of the Organization of American States, the Ambassador
Representative of Chile has proposed the following:
ierious situation created by armed strife in the
Dominican Republic"; and
The urgency of the convocation makes it necessary to
call attention to the provisions of Article 42 of the Charter
of the OAS, adopting as regulations those approved by the
Council at the meeting held on March 1, 1951, and designat-
ing the Pan American Union, in Washington, D* -., as the
site of the meeting;
THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF - :AN STATES
RESOLVES
:
1. To convoke, pursuant to Articles 39 and 40 of the
Charter of the Organization of American States, a Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics for May 1, 1965.
2. To approve as the agenda of this meeting the
following
:
"Serious situation created by the armed strife
in the Dominican Republic."
3. To approve as the Regulations of the Conference
those approved by the Council of the Organization of American
States at the meeting held on March 1, 1951*
.
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4. To designate the Pan American Union, Washington,
D. C, , as the site of the Meeting,
5. To request the Secretary General to inform the
governments of the member states of the OAS of this decision,
in the most rapid way possible, calling attention to the
provisions of Article 42 of the Charter of the Organization
of American states.
6. To appoint a committee to begin today to study
the preparations for this Meeting, in the more urgent aspects






RESOLUTION CALLING FOR CEASE-FIRE
THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STA3
RESOLVES
:
1. To reiterate the call of April 29, 1965 upon all
the authorities, the political groupings, and the opposing
forces to pursue immediately all possible means by which a
cease-fire may be established and all hostilities and mili-
tary operations suspended in order to prevent further tragic
loss of life or injury as well as material damages in the
sister Dominican Republic.
2. To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities,
political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the
immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of
refuge, encompassing the geographical area of the city of
Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of
foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be
respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals
of all countries will be given safe haven.
3. To inform the Security Council of the United
Nations of the text of this resolution pursuant to Article




RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING OAS COMMITTEE
THE TENTH MEETING OP CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Decides to establish a committee composed of
representatives of the following five member states:
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Fanama;
2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the
city of Santo Jomingo, to do everything possible to obtain
the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions, and to
give priority to the following two functions
:
a. To offer its good offices to the Dominican
armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic repre-
sentatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently:
i. a cease-fire; and
ii. the orderly evacuation of the persons
who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign
citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and
b. To carry out an investigation of all aspects
of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the
convocation of this Meeting;
3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the
Meeting on the progress of its work, including the conclu-
sions and recommendations that it may consider appropriate,
in the shortest time possible;
4. Requests the American governments and the Secre-
tary General of the Organization of American States to extend
their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of
the Committee; and
5. Instructs the Secretary General of the Organiza-
tion of American States to transmit to the Security Council
of the United Nations the text of this resolution, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the Charter
of the United Nations,
-
APPENDIX D
RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING INTER-AMERICAN FORCE
WHEREAS:
This Meeting at its session of May 1, 1965, estab-
lished a Committee to proceed to the Dominican Republic to
seek the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions in
the territory of that republic;
The said resolution requests the American governments
and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American
States to extend their full cooperation to facilitate the
work of the Committee;
The formation of an inter-American force will signify
ipso facto the transformation of the forces presently in
Dominican territory into another force that will not be that
of one state or of a group of states but that of the Organi-
zation of American States, which Organization is charged
with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will
of its members
;
The American states being under the obligation to
provide reciprocal assistance to each other, the Organization
is under greater obligation to safeguard the principles of
the Charter and to do everything possible so that in situa-
tions such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic
appropriate measures may be taken leading to the re-
establishment of peace and normal democratic conditions;
The Organization of American States being competent
to assist the member states in the preservation of peac^ and
the re-establishment of normal democratic conditions, it is
also competent to provide the means that reality and circum-
stances require and that prudence counsels as adequate for
the accomplishment of such purposes; and
The Committee of the Organization of American States
.
that proceeded to the Dominican Republic , in its second
report to this Meeting, advises the formation of an inter-
American force to achieve the objectives determined by the
Meeting of Consultation,





1. To request governments of member states that are
willing and capable of doing so to make contingents of their
land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organiza-
tion of American States, within their capabilities and to
the extent they can do so, to form an inter-American force
that will operate under the authority of this Tenth Meeting
of Consultation,
2. That this Force will have as its sole purpose, in
a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in
the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican
Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and
the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment
of an atmos >f peace and conciliation that will permit
the functioning of democratic institutions,
3. To request the commanders of the contingents of
forces that make up this Force to work out directly among
themselves and with a Committee of ;ting the tech-
nical measures necessary to establish a Unified Command of
the Organization of American States for the coordinated and
effective action of the Inter-American Armed Force. In the
composition of this Force an effort will be made to see that
the national contingents will be progressively equalized.
4. That at such time as the OAS Unified Command shall
have determined that the Inter-American Armed Force is
adequate for the purposes contemplated by the resolution
adopted by this Meeting on May 1, 1965, the full respon-
sibility of meeting these purposes shall be assumed by that
Force.
5. That the withdrawal of the Inter-American Force
from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this
Meeting.
6. To continue in session in order to keep the situa-
tion under review, to receive the report and recommendations
of the Committee, and in the light thereof bo take the neces-
sary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of demo-
cratic order in the Dominican Republic.
7. To inform the Security Council of the United





URUGUAYAN DRAFT RESOLUTION OF MAY 11, 1965
Th€ Security Council
,
Having considered the situation existing in the
Dominican Republic
,
.re l-.li\g tiote £ the communications JaLted 29 April, 30
April, 1 Kay, 3 May and 6 May 1965 from the Organization of
American States, reporting on the measures taken by that
Organization in connexion with the situation existing in the
Dominican Republic,
Haying regard to Articles 24, 34 and 35, and the rele-
vant provisions of Chapter VIII, of the Charter of t
United Nations
,
Reaffirming the principles set forth in Chapter I of
the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, in
Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7,
Haying particular regard also to the provisions of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States,
!• Expresses its deep concern at the recent develop-
ments in the Dominican Republic;
2. Reaffirms the right of the people of the Dominican
Republic freely to exercise, without coercion of any kind,
their sovereign right of self-determination;
*• Urgently appeals to all contending factions in
the Dominican Republic to cease hostilities and to make
every possible effort to achieve a peaceful and democratic
settlement of their differences;
4# Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely
the events in the Dominican Republic and to take such measures
as he may deem appropriate for the purpose of reporting to
the Security Council on all aspects of the situation;
5 » Invites the Organization of American States to
keep the Security Council promptly and fully informed of the
,
sS^Sfc'S^hSM?* °f9«"*-**tion of America States withrespect to t e situation existing in the DorainicanRepuolic,
to =o-oPerafe^i|Fi?Setc?.t^^S o°l STfef**"'Nations in the implementation of this resoL^n?

APPENDIX F
;CURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF MAY 14, 1965
The Security Council
,
Deeply concerned at the grave events in the Dominican
Republic
,
1. Calls for strict cease-fire;
2* Invito
3
the Secretary-General to send, as an
urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic
for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on the
present situation;
3. Calls upon all concerned in the Dominican Republic
to co-operate with the representative of the Secretary-
General in the carrying out of this task.
'j
'




